India’s Nuclear Policy

The relationship between International Nuclear Regimes and developing nations is a matter of passionate debate. Debate is in process on certain issues like nuclear policy, on grand strategies, on basic political values etc. It is a debate with implications for our individual and collective existence and raises fundamental question about political preferences, approaches and pathways ahead. The end of World War II and use of nuclear bomb presented US with new kind of strategic dilemma. How could a potentially apocalyptic technology once discovered, permanently be kept out of the hands of competitors and in March 1963, President J. F. Kennedy warned the Americans public that 15-25 states would come to posses nuclear weapons by 1970. (Spector,Sanfrancisco,1990) Currently 09 states have successfully detonated nuclear weapons of which 05 are called Nuclear Weapon States- US, Russia, U. K, France, China and rest are India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. The prediction of President Kennedy did not come to pass is not because of lack of technological know how but rather several states that could have developed nuclear weapon program chose not to do so and signed NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) as non- nuclear weapon states. It is the most questionable treaty by International Nuclear Regime and posses direct criticism from developing nations. The discrimination is inherent in NPT as it allows some state to have nuclear weapons while others not and it is sidestepped by the inclusion of Article VI. It represents a diplomatic victory in the cold war era; success was almost destined from the outset due to simple strategic dynamic: nuclear armed states, as they didn’t want to nullify their strategic advantage by allowing competitors to acquire nuclear weapons. http://www. ippnw. org/Resourcelibrary/Treaties Brief. Pdf) CTBT banns all nuclear explosions, whether they take place in atmosphere or underground the earth. It was negotiated in Geneva between 1994 and 1996. The treaty has not come into force. Without the support from key players like US, China, DPRK, Egypt, to a lesser degree India etc. , it faces an uncertain future. India-Pak largely owing to their low-level nuclear arms race, have not signed the treaty. Though a lot of external pressure is constantly been made for it. (http://www. ocstoc. com/docs/5313084/CTBTO-Fact-Sheet-CTBT-Comprehensive-Nucl earTeat-Ban-Treaty) FMCT- Fissile Material Cut off Treaty similarly bans the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Again it has faced similar results as of earlier treaties. There has been a nuclear non-proliferation regime since 1957, but its future is in doubt. Increasingly bilateral influences on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programs indicate retrenchment from cooperative multilateral behavior. Restrictions on technology transfer, undertaken in efforts to prevent the creation of the unit veto-system have impelled developing countries to break out of the collaborative framework of the regime and pursue autarchic strategies. As far as norms like universality is concerned the developing countries mistrust proposed universal institutions because of disparities in power maintaing advantages for the developed states even under ostensibly universal rules. Also the developing states countering to the International Nuclear Regimes are reluctant to accept sovereignty costs without symbolic and material compensations. Brito, New York, 1983) The Nuclear suppliers states have historically been able to monopolize the supply of materials facilities and technology, because they have the leverage of monopoly suppliers, they have been able to make demands on other states that can’t be ignored. The developing states have had little of the power within the regime enjoyed by the nuclear suppliers. (Schiff, New Jersey, 1984) Along with these the other treaties and groups like outer space treaty, Sea bed treaty, London Group, Australia Group etc. hich form the international nuclear regime are known for their discriminatory policies especially for the concern of developing nations. So it becomes necessary to study their role in making of nuclear policy of India. The Indian Nuclear Program was started in mid-1940s as India gained independence from centuries of British rule, and after the use of atomic weapons against Japan by U. S. both these legacies have had an impact on Indian leaders. In 1948 the Atomic Energy Act was set up. Under it the Department of Atomic Energy was created in 1954. (http://www. world-nuclear. org/info/inf53. tml) Obduracy of Nuclear powers of the world compelled India to go nuclear. Legitimization of nuclear weapons by international community also contributed towards India going nuclear. Rising trends of intervention by the industrialized nations in the domestic affairs of developi ng nations, among which India is also one, also compelled India to direct its nuclear resources towards nuclear weapons. It was necessary for India to protect the autonomy of decision making in the developmental process in strategic matter which are inalienable democratic rights of one sixth of the global population residing in India. From the beginning, the Indian nuclear programme was ambitious, India developed facilities for mining Uranium, fabricating fuel, manufacturing heavy water, and reprocessing spent fuel etc. the program never lost sight of the military uses of atomic energy. During 1950s Homi Bhabha, the chief architect of nuclear program, was greatly interested in developing the technology for peaceful nuclear explosions, an interest that culminated ultimately in the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran. Yet India was a champion of NAM. Even as its nuclear program was growing, India was at the forefront of several disarmament proposals including CTBT, originally suggested by Nehru in 1954. (Rajain, New Delhi, 2005) National Security considerations -During the negotiations of Nuclear NPT in 1967, India argued against the discriminatory aspect and called it nuclear colonialism. During the course of the CTBT negotiations, there was a crucial change in the Indian stance. As Salman Hyder said â€Å"We don’t believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapon is essential for our national security and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard†. This was completely in line with the traditional Indian view point of not using nuclear weapon for military uses. But on 20-June-1996 when the Indian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, rejected the CTBT in the present form, she said that the CTBT was not in Indian security interests and our national security considerations have become a key factor in our decision making. This was a marked shift in Indian nuclear policy making. (Peimani, New Delhi, 2000) Domestic Trends- These shifts towards global disarmament and its increasingly strident criticism of any step by step measures towards nuclear disarmament influenced by domestic or internal trends on forces. Ever since the early 1960s, hawkish sections of the Indian policy making community have argued in the domestic media in favor of building a nuclear arsenal. The 1974 nuclear tests is in part, a display of their influences. The last few governments in India have been relatively weak and unstable, all formed by coalitions of various parties with different agendas. Hence there came a little slowdown in the the nuclear policy making as parties from the left-Marxist views turned out to be an obstacle dealing with the issue at international level and many other factors also pressurized the relatively weak governments. But governments managed to follow consistent opposition to any restraints on Indian nuclear and missile program. (http://www. meadv. gov. in/govt/inducld. html) In reality however, Indian leaders including Rajiv Gandhi, V. P. Singh, Atal Bihari Vajpayee- did the bare minimum to operationalize and institutionalize the nuclear option. Also the nuclear weapons are seen by political leaders essentially as a way to enhance their domestic standing and their nation’s international status. PM Indira Gandhi’s decision to give green light to 1974 PNE was domestic politics. Similarly after series of tests in May 1998, Home Minister L. K. Advani felt compelled to issue a nuclear threat to Pakistan. While China is cited as the motivation behind India’s Nuclear Weapons Programme, but that is irrelevant to most of the Indians for whom Pakistan is a bigger threat. Similar nuclear nationalism is also evident in the actions of Indian leaders at International level. The crossover of the external pressure into the domestic political arena was evident during CTBT negotiations. Both P. VNarsimha Rao and H. D. Deve Gowda governments showed unvandering support towards India’s strategic enclave (and opposition to CTBT). But on the other hand there was perception that after 1999 the doors would be closed to enhance India’s nuclear status so much so that Former PM I. K Gujral a nuclear dove admitted that had he continued in office until Sep. 999, the pressure to test would have been difficult to resist. But in spite of weak coalition government Indian hawks managed pressure imposed by the NWS and particularly USA. Also the economic liberalization program has contributed in an indirect way to the campaign. Hand in hand with the 5-10% increase in the Indian economy has been the rise of Indian elite group who insisted to make India a powerful nation. (Sidhu, NewDelhi, 2004). India has proved that it is capable of playing hard ball with the great powers and the time has come for the west especially USA to recognize India’s nuclear status. And was done also as Nuclear deal with US, Russia, France, Canada, Kazakhstan, Mongolia etc. Till December 2008 Russia’s Rosatom and French- Areva had contracted to supply Uranium. Where as January 2009- Kazatomprom signed a MoU for supplying 300tones Uranium in 2010-11. September 2009 Uranium supply agreement with Mongolia and Namibia. March 2010 Russia offered India stake in its Sakha Republic and agreed on a Joint Venture with ARMZ uranium holding. In July 2010 the Minster of Science and technology reported that India had received 868tU from France, Russia and Kazakhstan. http://www. meadv. gov. in/govt/inducld. html) Following the 2005 agreement between US and Indian heads of state on nuclear energy cooperation, UK indicated its strong support for great cooperation and France- Canada moved in similar direction. US department of commerce, the UK and Canada relaxed control on exports of technology to Indian staying under guidelines of NSG. In October 2008 US-Congress passed the bill allowing civil nuclear trade with India and also a nuclear trade agreement was signed with France. Erckel, London, 2008) As of now India has total 19 operating nuclear power reactors other than this 04 are under construction 39- are planned or firmly proposed. 05 new Nuclear Energy Parks under construction Uranium resources 54000 tones uranium is reasonably assured resources 2350 tones uranium estimated additional in situ. (http://www. world-nuclear. org/info/info80. html) All this proves India to be a big Nuclear State with accelerated growth in the nuclear sector. Also it becomes important to look into the matter that how in spite of not signing any disarmament or nuclear non-proliferation agreement and keeping a strong standing position against all the external pressures exerted by big powers, how India managed to officially mark its presences in the nuclear club. As doing various nuclear trade agreements with countries like US, France, Canada, Russia etc. in itself position India to be a nuclear weapon state which earlier these countries were not willing to agree with. The status of India as the head of developing countries against the International nuclear regime is also the matter to be studied in order understand Indian Nuclear Policy. The dramatic changes from a nuclear dove to a nuclear hawk behavior in the Indian policy making with regard to nuclear issues is another point to be studied. And the fundamental change in the domestic politics from single party government to coalition has also marked great influence in the nuclear policy making.